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MS. ROTHMAN:  Good afternoon and welcome to “A Conversation on 
Financial Literacy,” organized by Res Gestae, the online companion to the 
Fordham Law Review.1 
My name is Alexie Rothman, and I am the Online Editor for Volume 80 
of the Law Review.  I am honored to introduce Professors Susan Block-Lieb 
and Andrea Boyack, our two panelists today. 
Professor Block-Lieb, the Cooper Family Chair of Urban Legal Studies 
at Fordham University School of Law, teaches courses in bankruptcy, 
secured transactions, consumer protection, and other commercial law.  She 
is General Counsel and sits on the Board of Directors for the Coalition for 
Debtor Education housed at the Law School.  Among other honors, 
Professor Block-Lieb sits on the Board of Directors for Fordham 
University’s Center on International Policy Studies and is an inducted 
member of the International Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law, 
the American College of Bankruptcy, and the International Insolvency 
Institute. 
Professor Boyack is a Visiting Professor at Fordham University School 
of Law for the 2011–12 academic year.  Professor Boyack has written 
extensively and presented on issues related to the recent housing crisis, the 
secondary mortgage market, and common-interest community governance.  
Prior to entering academia, Professor Boyack practiced corporate and real 
 
 1. This conversation took place on March 28, 2012 at Fordham University School of 
Law.  The transcript has been lightly edited. 
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estate law for thirteen years with Reed Smith; Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver 
& Jacobson; Goodwin Procter; and O’Melveny & Myers.  Professor 
Boyack has also served as in-house counsel to Toll Brothers, Inc., a 
publicly held national development company. 
Today’s conversation focuses on financial literacy and the newly created 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).  I will ask our panelists a 
series of questions. 
Let’s start with some background.  What is the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau? 
PROF. BOYACK:  The CFPB really arose out of the financial crisis, 
which arose out of the subprime crisis.  For several decades, the 
government had been sponsoring Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to attract 
capital to the housing mortgage market, and they did this through 
securitization.2 
By the 1990s, what you had is private market players doing the same 
thing with nonprime loans.3  Because these loans could be pooled and their 
risks aggregated and reallocated among tranches, you had subprime loans 
that could generate highly rated investment products.4  This attracted more 
market capital to real estate, which grew real estate prices.5 
We ended up having from 1996 to 2006 a housing bubble.6  The real 
estate prices in the United States actually rose between 93 percent and 137 
percent during that time.7  That housing bubble was inflated by 
securitization, over-leveraging, and rampant subprime lending.8  Finally, 
when the values started declining in 2006, the entire house of cards that was 
the U.S. real estate finance market collapsed.9  The subprime crisis 
triggered a broader housing crisis and a financial crisis in the country, 
which led to what we have now, a global crisis of credit and national debt. 
It’s actually kind of an amazing fact that you have a few or many poorly 
conceived home mortgage loans in discrete segments in the country that can 
basically bring the entire world economy to its knees.  It’s a testimony not 
only to the huge interconnectedness of financial markets today, but also to 
how important it is to look at what loans are made and make sure that we 
have disincentivized faulty loan premises and that we create some ways to 
protect consumers from bad products. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, Congress passed several acts which just 
dealt with the crisis itself:  the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008,10 the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,11 the American Recovery 
 
 2. Andrea J. Boyack, Lessons in Price Stability from the U.S. Real Estate Market 
Collapse, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925, 939–42. 
 3. Id. at 943. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 928 n.9. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 932. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613. 
 11. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765. 
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and Reinvestment Act of 2009;12 and finally, in 2010, Congress passed a 
comprehensive act not just dealing with reactions to the crisis but looking 
prospectively at how do we address the substantive problems in the markets 
and create a more stable financial environment going forward.  That was the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,13 a seminal 
piece of legislation, very sweeping in its scope, and at 2,300 pages not even 
complete, because it set up several hundred other rulemakings and studies 
that had to be done. 
Title 10 of Dodd-Frank created this new agency of the federal 
government, this new bureau, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.14  
It was to prioritize and consolidate financial protection efforts in the 
government.  That was the mission statement of the CFPB, to implement 
and, where applicable, enforce federal consumer financial law consistently 
and ensure that all consumers have access to the markets and that the 
services are fair, transparent, and competitive.15 
PROF. BLOCK-LIEB:  It’s clear that the subprime mortgage crisis gave 
Congress the incentive to enact broad-reaching consumer financial 
protection regulation.  But it’s important to understand that Title 10 of 
Dodd-Frank didn’t really reinvent the wheel.  The Bureau is new, but 
consumer financial protection is not new with Dodd-Frank. 
One of the most important things that Dodd-Frank did is to transfer to the 
Bureau jurisdiction over eighteen preexisting consumer financial protection 
regulations—the Truth in Lending Act,16 for example, and the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act.17  The jurisdiction over those statutes had been 
divided amongst a number of regulatory authorities, and that regulatory 
jurisdiction was consolidated in a single federal agency, the Bureau for 
Consumer Financial Protection. 
This consolidation relates not only to rulemaking authority but also to the 
authority for enforcing those regulations.  Also, remember some of these 
lenders are banks, who are otherwise regulated, and some of the lenders are 
non-bank entities.  It’s important for there to be a level playing field in the 
market for consumer financial protection so that bank and non-bank lenders 
face precisely the same regulation.  So this consolidation of regulatory 
authority within the Bureau served a good purpose in that perspective as 
well. 
Dodd-Frank was careful, however, to divide up the enforcement and the 
monitoring jurisdiction that the Bureau holds.  So while the Bureau has 
exclusive rulemaking authority over consumer financial protection, it shares 
 
 12. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115. 
 13. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered titles of 
U.S.C.). 
 14. Id. § 1011, 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (Supp. IV 2010). 
 15. Id. § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511. 
 16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2006).  
 17. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1002, 1061, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481, 5581. 
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enforcement authority with the prudential regulators, most notably the 
Office of the Controller of Currency.18 
Now, people talk a lot about the CFPB’s authority to regulate unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive financial practices.  But again, Dodd-Frank didn’t 
invent this terminology or this basis for rulemaking.  This rulemaking 
authority is not new.  In fact, it was adopted in 1938.  Since 1938, the 
Federal Trade Commission has had authority to regulate unfair and 
deceptive practices, which they have defined certainly from the 1960s, but 
through their enforcement actions even earlier, to relate to financial 
practices that are deemed unfair and deceptive, although the FTC did not 
have jurisdiction to enforce these financial practice regulations against 
banks and other regulated entities.19 
But that doesn’t mean that the banks were free to engage in unfair and 
deceptive practices.  It just meant that their prudential regulators were 
meant to enforce unfair and deceptive practices regulations as against their 
regulated entities.  In theory, the prudential regulators should have and 
could have regulated in this area.  They chose not to, more specifically 
since 1980, when deregulation has been more the vogue than enforcement 
of regulation or enhanced regulation.20 
The Federal Reserve Board also had jurisdiction to regulate unfair and 
deceptive practices.  They didn’t exercise that regulatory authority until 
2009, when they adopted Reg. AA.21 
While the FTC Act, the original source of jurisdiction over unfair and 
deceptive practices, didn’t make reference to—and so therefore didn’t allow 
for—the regulation of abusive practices, of course the common law did.  
That’s what the defense of unconscionability is meant to address, as well as 
the defense of undue influence and duress.  They’re about abusive practices. 
Moreover, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), specifically 
in the statutory language, identified abusive collection practices which are 
subject to the authority under the FDCPA.22 
PROF. BOYACK:  It’s interesting, because clearly you don’t have a 
departure from where the law has been for a while.  But the CFPB is really 
interesting because it is a new agency.  It’s an agency that is being built in 
the twenty-first century from the ground up. 
It was an interesting development both in terms of consolidation, in terms 
of making sure consumer protection was owned as somebody’s primary 
responsibility in the regulatory world, avoiding regulatory arbitrage, which 
we mentioned.  But also, it’s kind of exciting, kind of a unique opportunity 
for a regulatory agency to deliberately build itself in this modern way from 
the ground up. 
 
 18. Id. §§ 1025, 1026, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5515–5516. 
 19. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 12 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
 20. KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS 16 (2011). 
 21. Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, 12 C.F.R. § 227 (2009). 
 22. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 806, 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (2006). 
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It spent some time as a Bureau thinking deliberately about how it was 
going to define itself.  It seems to focus a lot on looking outside the box, 
trying to figure out what tools are out there and what approaches it can take 
to achieve its objectives—the objectives not being anything new, but what’s 
new I think is in the broader thinking of the approach. 
Also, what’s kind of different about the Bureau is that they really are 
embracing twenty-first century technology and looking at things like the 
internet, and there’s blogs and Twitter feeds, which they are really trying to 
connect and be part of people’s lives in a twenty-first century technology 
way.23 
So they have this ability to determine for themselves how best to achieve 
their objectives, and they have been very focused on doing research and 
seeking input.  They have this rather unique mandate to solely focus on 
consumer financial literacy from the consumer side, rather than as part of 
banking safety and soundness. 
MS. ROTHMAN:  How exactly is the CFPB organized? 
PROF. BLOCK-LIEB:  Unlike some regulatory agencies, like the FTC 
for example, which has a Board of Commissioners (odd-numbered) 
appointed in staggered terms, the Bureau has a single director who is 
appointed for a five-year term, and the director sits in charge of the six 
different divisions of the Bureau.24 
I suppose we should mention that although the director was meant to 
have been put in place this past summer, through political wrangling that 
didn’t happen.  President Obama has appointed Richard Cordray as the first 
director of the Bureau through his recess appointment powers under the 
Constitution.25  Even that has been controversial.  The ultimate authority of 
Richard Cordray, as well as other recess appointments, will be resolved 
through litigation. 
If President Obama is elected to a second term, this issue almost 
necessarily goes away.  It is a first-mover problem, in that the second 
director appointed by whomever the President is after the expiration of the 
first director’s five-year term—there is not the same political incentive for 
stalling, because the first director sits in his office until the second director 
is appointed.  So there is no point in failing to appoint a second director. 
Now, the six divisions of the Bureau—three of them are, I suppose, the 
divisions that we would see in any regulatory agency:  a General Counsel’s 
Office; External Affairs; a Chief Operating Officer, which handles 
employment and other issues; as well as the Consumer Complaint Division, 
which is new to the Bureau.26 
 
 23. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ (last 
visited May 11, 2012). 
 24. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011(b)–(c), 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (Supp. IV 2010). 
 25. Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer 
Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1. 
 26. Learn About the Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited May 11, 2012). 
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And, like other regulatory agencies, the Bureau has charge of regulatory 
authority, which their division has called Research Markets and 
Regulation.27  It’s interesting to me when they choose to put “regulation” at 
the end of the sentence rather than at the beginning, although I think it’s 
kind of a German verb here.  I think that really is what the division is about. 
Not very uncommon in regulatory agencies, there is a Division of 
Supervision, Enforcement, Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity.28  Not 
surprising.  What is relatively new about the Bureau, and what we want to 
focus on, is its Division of Consumer Education and Engagement.29 
MS. ROTHMAN:  Can you actually explain a bit about what that 
division is focused on? 
PROF. BOYACK:  It’s one of the six major divisions, which itself 
indicates the priority level that financial literacy has within the modern 
concept of consumer protection.  Its mission is to provide information and 
tools to consumers so they can make good financial decisions. 
The catchphrase you always hear is they are trying to “get people the 
right information at the right time.”30  What’s interesting is that they have 
been engaging in a rather broad effort to determine exactly what is “right” 
in this context, and “right” meaning not only the quantity of information or 
the amount of information, but the effectiveness of the method of 
disseminating information. 
Now, there is an education and engagement part of the office.  Education 
focuses on providing this information to the public.  They have been 
working a lot with the existing framework of consumer financial literacy 
efforts of a lot of private and public consumer educators to accomplish that. 
The engagement piece focuses instead on soliciting information from the 
public.  This is where you see some rather innovative things going on:  
internet-based feedback solicitation; there’s the “Tell Your Story” effort, 
where if you go on the CFPB website you can click there and type in what 
happened to you;31  and they are soliciting comments on their preliminary-
stage regulatory products there.32  So there is a lot of effort to try to get 
input from the public.  They have live meetings with consumers.  They have 
had various town hall meetings—I believe over sixty.33 
So this engagement piece also overlaps with this consumer response 
piece, the Division of Complaints, because those consumer engagements 
also include soliciting people to make complaints about issues that they 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB, Prepared Remarks Before the Consumer Bankers 
Association (Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/
prepared-remarks-by-richard-cordray-before-the-consumer-bankers-association/. 
 31. Tell Your Story, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://help.consumerfinance.
gov/app/tellyourstory/ (last visited May 11, 2012). 
 32. Know Before You Owe, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/knowbeforeyouowe/ (last visited May 11, 2012). 
 33. Cf. Zixta Q. Martinez, Save the Date, New York!, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION 
BUREAU (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/save-the-date-new-york/. 
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have with their mortgage provider, their credit card provider, and then they 
will work to resolve it through working with both the consumer and the 
financial service provider.34  It’s sort of an ombudsman office role, but it’s 
like an ombudsman with a regulatory hammer, so they have a little more 
power to get that resolved. 
They focus the education initiative not just generally, as we’ll be talking 
more, but also they have four specific vulnerable populations that they have 
tried to make sure are particularly considered and protected, the financial 
educations through those four focus groups of citizens.  They are deemed 
the most vulnerable segments of society and make up about 150–200 
million people in the United States.  That includes the servicemen; students; 
older Americans sixty-two and up; and the group that they call “financial 
empowerment,” which essentially covers lower-income people and people 
who have been outside the financial mainstream—for example, not having a 
bank account.35 
MS. ROTHMAN:  So let’s focus a bit on financial literacy.  Aside from 
putting it within the Division of Education and Engagement, how does it fit 
into the CFPB’s mandate? 
PROF. BLOCK-LIEB:  There are two different ways of looking at how 
education fits into the Bureau’s mandate.  One way is maybe in terms of the 
organizational chart of the Bureau.  Normally you would think of sort of a 
top-down organizational chart where the director has six offices, he has six 
direct reporters, and each of the six direct reporters has a silo of authority 
over which they devote their attention. 
Although the Bureau describes its organization with that typical sort of 
organization chart, I actually conceive of the Bureau’s mandate as involving 
more of a hub-and-spoke sort of organizational chart, in that the educational 
mandate is one that the Bureau is using, maybe together with its research 
mandate, to inform itself regarding what it is that isn’t working about the 
markets and what it is that isn’t working about existing regulation, so that 
their regulatory and enforcement efforts can both be informed by that sort 
of detailed and fine-grained information—detailed and fine-grained because 
literally they are receiving information from individual consumers.  You 
would think maybe in the nineteenth or the twentieth century that would be 
a hugely inefficient way of regulating.  But over the internet, the Bureau 
can keep track of that kind of fine-grained level of information.  So that’s 
one way of looking at the interrelationship. 
The other way I think about it, from an academic perspective, is the 
Bureau as a twenty-first century regulator who learns from Cass Sunstein 
and other behavioral research decision making scholarship that looks to 
nudge both ends of the marketplace through use of what they refer to as 
“soft paternalism”—not paternalism; we’re not telling consumers what they 
have to do, we’re not telling them that they’re stupid and here’s how they 
 
 34. Submit a Complaint, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,  
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
 35. Learn About the Bureau, supra note 26. 
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can learn more—but instead, setting up regulations so that incentives exist 
and information is available both on the demand and the supply side of that 
market.36  I wasn’t just reading this into what the organization chart is of 
the Bureau.  In one of Rich Cordray’s most recent speeches, he describes 
consumer financial protection as a partnership, if you will, between 
consumers and lenders.37 
Clearly, regulation is in some respects about constraining lenders’ 
behaviors in the marketplace, but very little of consumer financial 
protection regulation outright regulates either financial products or financial 
practices.  We do have some of these, but the goal is not to over-regulate 
but rather to tweak the level of regulation so that we’re not over-regulating 
lenders.  On the other hand, there are incentives that are built into the 
regulation to nudge lenders into particular situations.  The idea in this 
context is to nudge them into situations that are more favorable for 
consumers overall. 
Similarly, regulation could outright affect consumers’ behavior by 
making certain products unavailable to them or by mandating education 
initiatives, or what have you, that would be sort of a hard paternalism.  But 
here the nudging is about making opportunities available, opening up other 
opportunities for consumers.  So for example, in the CARD Act of 2009, 
which the Bureau takes jurisdiction over as a part of this transfer of 
jurisdiction, there are a variety of contract terms in credit card agreements 
that the public and that consumer advocates had viewed as unfair, indeed 
predatory.  They came to convince Congress that this was perhaps the case. 
But, rather than outlawing these practices outright, what the CARD Act 
does is—just to take one of them, with the over-limit fees associated with 
debit cards, the notion here is that it’s a product, and for some consumers a 
very useful product, but for others a trap, a trick, that’s buried in the fine 
print of their debit card agreement.  So the regulation, rather than prohibit 
over-limit fees, nudges both the lenders and the consumers by requiring 
consumers to opt in to these over-limit fee arrangements rather than opt 
out.38 
MS. ROTHMAN:  So thinking about some of the nudges we might see 
from the CFPB with respect to financial literacy, what are some of the 
specific programs or initiatives that have been started in the past year? 
 
 36. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:  IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4–6 (2008); Michael S. Barr, Sendhil 
Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Credit Regulation, in 
BORROWING TO LIVE:  CONSUMER AND MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED 170, 188–98 (Nicolas 
P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008). 
 37. See Justin T. Hilley, Citizens and Government Must Change Mortgage Finance 
Together:  Cordray, HOUSINGWIRE (Mar. 16, 2012, 11:59 AM), 
http://www.housingwire.com/news/citizens-and-government-must-change-mortgage-
finance-together-cordray. 
 38. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-24, § 102, 123 Stat. 1734, 1739 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
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PROF. BOYACK:  One of the ones that has gotten a lot of attention that 
President Obama mentioned in his State of the Union is the “Know Before 
You Owe”39—it’s just a fun phrase to say.  This is a disclosure regime.  But 
it goes beyond what we have been seeing before.  Disclosure was really the 
cornerstone of consumer financial protection before the crisis.  What ended 
up happening is, when you had disclosure as a mandate, it started being 
used by the financial institutions, instead of being a tool for financial 
empowerment; it was really a tool for risk management for those entities.  
Those entities said, “Well, this is great.  If we put all this stuff in the 
disclosure, then nobody can come to us later and say ‘You never told us this 
was there.’”  And so what you ended up having was really unmanageable, 
inaccessible, sometimes unintelligible, disclosure.  It was criticized by a lot 
of people.  Elizabeth Warren said, “It’s not real disclosure if it’s so vast.”40 
So I think the CFPB is recognizing this, that too much information that is 
poorly communicated is actually bad, and what we need to do is make sure 
that the consumers get the information, but make sure that we focus on 
what information is key and what is the key way to communicate that 
information. 
That’s where “Know Before You Owe” comes in, about making 
disclosure effective rather than comprehensive, focusing on the quality of 
the communication rather than the quantity.  The approach is to set up a 
standard form whereby you will have disclosure of various different pieces 
or characteristics of financial products.  That will aid the consumer in 
knowing what they actually need to know so their expectations are properly 
set, but also create an apples-to-apples comparison possibility, that you can 
look at two different possible loan products and be able to actually very 
clearly (is the hope) compare how much you’d have to pay or what the 
different possible fees would be under each of those. 
It has been interesting to see how this is still very much a work in 
progress.  In fact, they have just started the student loan and credit card 
disclosure form process.  But they have been working for a while on the one 
for a mortgage closing disclosure.41  Prior to this, we have already had 
mortgage disclosure forms.  We have the Truth in Lending Act Form, and 
we have the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) Form, HUD-
1.42  So if you go today to close on your mortgage loan for your home, they 
will give you these papers with a lot of line items and a lot of numbers.  But 
the “Know Before You Owe” form is trying to replace that with one form, 
rather than two, that makes the information a little more accessible to the 
consumer.43  One of the ways is it’s just actually easier to read. 
I have looked at the forms.  One thing that has been interesting is that the 
Bureau itself has been very transparent with their effort to come up with the 
forms.  They posted very preliminary forms on their website, solicited 
 
 39. Cf. Know Before You Owe, supra note 32. 
 40. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J., Summer 2007, at 8, 11. 
 41. See Know Before You Owe, supra note 32. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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comments.44  They have run focus group testing of prototype forms.  They 
have one called, I think, Butternut, and Hemlock, which right now are their 
two finalists.45  They are looking at them and soliciting people to actually 
write in and say, “I thought this part was confusing.” 
But they also, interestingly, are tracking what people are looking at on 
the internet, what parts they have to keep seeking more information about, 
to see either what interests people to find out or what parts are maybe not as 
accessible as they might think.46  They are almost ready to roll that out into 
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking now. 
But the interesting thing is all this happened before that.  They have 
already gotten all these comments.  They had 27,000 comments on the 
mortgage form, which is kind of amazing.47  So the form disclosure for 
mortgages and next student loans and credit cards has been the big push of 
“Know Before You Owe.” 
PROF. BLOCK-LIEB:  And it’s important to understand that the goal of 
this “Know Before You Owe” is not about standardization of financial 
products.  I know it’s a concern that the industry has raised.  But in talking 
to experts at the Bureau, it’s clear that their intention is not to limit 
innovation in the marketplace.48 
That’s very much consistent with this perspective of nudging lenders and 
nudging borrowers.  So the forms are there to provide safe harbors so that 
lenders can bury themselves in those safe harbors if risk management is the 
most important thing to them.  On the other hand, if they want to take a 
little more risk and think outside the box, that’s fine, but they have to take 
responsibility for those products.  So the statute is set up in order to make 
some of those less standardized products harder to securitize. 
PROF. BOYACK:  Right.  And the interesting thing here is you don’t 
have as much direct regulation of products saying, “This product is bad, 
you can’t use it.”  There is an attempt to foster product innovation.  You 
have a nudge towards plain-vanilla types of products, both because, in the 
Sunstein view of nudging, if you have a default product, you want it to be 
what most people want.49  So if people don’t take the opportunity to look at 
the more exotic products, they can get into one that we have determined is 
fairly safe. 
But also as a way to put a thumb on the scale to encourage those 
offerings of products by the lenders—not to prohibit exotic ones, but to 
make the mainstream, plain-vanilla ones probably the most common. 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Press Release, CFPB, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Convenes Small 
Business Panel for Know Before You Owe Mortgage Disclosures (Feb. 21, 2012), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-
convenes-small-business-panel-for-know-before-you-owe-mortgage-disclosures/. 
 48. See Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB, Prepared Remarks Before the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce (Mar. 28, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/
prepared-remarks-by-richard-cordray-before-the-u-s-chamber-of-commerce/. 
 49. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 36, at 12. 
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You see this in the mortgage world with the Qualified Residential 
Mortgage efforts, where they are defining characteristics, that if you make 
your mortgage a Qualified Residential Mortgage, then you as a financial 
provider, as a financial institution, a bank or whatever, you don’t have to go 
through the same types of hurdles to protect the consumer on the regulatory 
side.50  You don’t have to have the same kind of skin in the game; you 
don’t have the same worries with disclosure because you can fit it into that 
model.  So that’s an interesting way that they have balanced the worry that 
over-regulation is going to quash innovation with the concern that we need 
to have some sort of thumbs on the scale for the actual product types 
because sometimes you can’t get there just through disclosure.  That’s 
basically the big lesson leading up to the crisis. 
MS. ROTHMAN:  Maybe to switch gears for a second, there are existing 
federal initiatives to promote financial literacy.  How do Dodd-Frank and 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau work with those preexisting 
programs? 
PROFESSOR BLOCK-LIEB:  Dodd-Frank took a very interesting 
direction here.  Unlike with rulemaking authority, for example, where the 
CFPB by statute holds the central rulemaking authority relating to 
consumer financial protection, with the educational initiatives, with 
financial literacy, Congress left existing financial literacy initiatives in 
place, but it rearranged the table setting a little bit. 
Nearly all of the prudential regulators have financial literacy initiatives 
housed within their community affairs divisions.  Years ago, efforts were 
made to coordinate among these initiatives, because obviously that’s 
problematic to have so many cooks in the kitchen. 
Years ago, the Financial Literacy Education Commission (FLEC) was 
created.  Under Dodd-Frank, the Bureau will have not only a seat at the 
table and not only be a member of FLEC, but they will serve as its Vice 
Chair.51  So they will assist with some of the coordinating that FLEC 
otherwise provides. 
PROF. BOYACK:  And it’s kind of interesting, because using FLEC 
shows that CFPB’s goal really isn’t to reinvent the wheel, it isn’t to start 
over, that they are really trying to coordinate with the efforts that are 
already there.  For example, CFPB has embraced and specifically refers and 
links to the FDIC MyMoney website.52 
But they did see their role at FLEC being a little different than the role of 
the folks that are already there, because the banking regulators are coming 
into the question of what can be done for financial literacy from a banking 
safety and soundness perspective, which is right and proper. 
 
 50. See Dodd-Frank Act § 941, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (Supp. IV 2010). 
 51. See Richard Cordray, Joining the Financial Literacy and Education Commission, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
blog/joining-the-financial-literacy-and-education-commission/. 
 52. See Financial Education for Moms and All Women, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION 
BUREAU (May 8, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/category/mymoney-gov/. 
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But at the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, they are concerned with 
consumer protection from the other side, from the consumer side, and how 
consumers can be using financial products safely.  So it’s a new perspective 
at the table as well. 
PROF. BLOCK-LIEB:  And also would apply to lenders who are non-
banks, who are otherwise unregulated, which the existing situation of 
financial literacy initiatives within the prudential regulators left off the 
table, the possibility of imposing those obligations on non-bank lenders. 
PROF. BOYACK:  Right, which was another big problem from the 
crisis, is that you focus on certain entity types, and then the people who 
have been left out fall between the cracks and aren’t regulated at all. 
MS. ROTHMAN:  I’d like to pose the question, because I think it’s 
interesting:  How do you measure success in terms of financial literacy? 
PROF. BLOCK-LIEB:  Well, evidence-based research is better than 
anecdotally based research because it’s better to have a broad range of data 
on which to base your conclusions.  And yet, with financial literacy there 
are so many potential movements within the behaviors of especially 
borrowers, but also lenders that might be measured in terms of measuring 
success in a financial literacy education initiative. 
I was involved a couple of years ago in an academic group that had to put 
on the educational initiative in order to measure its success, because there 
weren’t any at the time.53  But we did both of those things and kept a little 
bit of a wall between us.  What I learned in interacting with social scientists 
was that, especially with these sorts of qualitative concerns, the better way 
of measuring success is to look at it from several different perspectives. 
One way of looking at success in financial literacy is knowledge 
acquisition—literally, the way a fourth-grade teacher would measure 
success:  did the children know more about financial literacy before or after 
having gone to the class?  That’s one. 
But it’s only a very limited measure of success because, as we’re 
reminded, we are concerned not so much about whether consumers can, for 
example, recite to you the formula for present valuation; we’re actually 
much more concerned about whether they understand the implications of 
making only minimum payments on their credit cards, for example.  So we 
have to be very careful about what questions we ask in terms of assessing 
knowledge acquisition.  That’s just one. 
Another thing we would want to measure is behaviors.  So even those 
consumers who attend financial literacy classes or counseling sessions may 
not be able to recite back to you the things that the teacher wants them to 
recite back, so they measure poorly on knowledge acquisition scores, but 
their behaviors may change.  They may think before they use their credit 
card, they may open a bank account, they may read a contract before 
signing it.  So those sorts of behaviors are important. 
 
 53. See Richard L. Wiener, Corinne Baron-Donovan, Karen Gross & Susan Block-Lieb, 
Debtor Education, Financial Literacy, and Pending Bankruptcy Legislation, 23 BEHAV. SCI. 
& L. 347 (2005). 
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There are also lenders’ behaviors.  Much of our economy, not limited to 
our financial decision making, is subject to various gatekeeping 
procedures—so credit history, credit reports, credit scores.  Another way of 
measuring success is to see whether lenders—that is, those keeping those 
scores—think that creditors are more successful as a result of the financial 
literacy education.  That’s just two of many. 
MS. ROTHMAN:  There are some, though, who might be skeptical about 
financial literacy,54 and we can’t ignore those when thinking about financial 
literacy and the CFPB.  So where are those skeptics coming from and how 
do you respond? 
PROF. BOYACK:  I think a lot of this comes from the view that the 
disclosure-only regime leading up to the crisis was not effective and that 
merely trying to empower consumers in a way takes the focus off of the 
regulatory side and burdens the consumers with the responsibility of 
protecting themselves; and then, if they don’t protect themselves, they only 
have themselves to blame. 
There’s some resistance in this country.  We have an individual liberty 
presumption in this country.  There is resistance to the paternalism that 
you’d have if you had more of an active method of protecting consumers, 
sort of protecting them from themselves:  “We’re not going to let you make 
a bad loan because we think that you are not wise enough to do it.” 
On the other side, you say, “Clearly the solution is consumer 
empowerment through literacy-building efforts.”  They are sometimes 
criticized as not being effective, or maybe creating false confidence, or just 
letting the financial institutions off the hook.  There is never really going to 
be an even playing field between the consumer and the institutions. 
But I think that the skeptics focus so narrowly on this one piece of the 
equation, they don’t realize that in the post-crisis world, we are trying to 
pursue consumer financial literacy as part of a comprehensive market-
improvement plan. 
It’s not just the one side.  You also have the idea that we’re going to have 
nudges, we’re going to have types of preferred products, and we are going 
to have regulatory oversight.  You can’t ignore that piece.  If you just focus 
on the one piece, you say, “It’s not as effective as it could be, therefore it’s 
bad,” it’s kind of this nirvana fallacy.55 
PROF. BLOCK-LIEB:  So absolutely there was this ideological core to 
financial literacy education being pushed in earlier administrations.  I think 
that there is a reaction against financial literacy as being promoted as the 
only option:  “Disclosure plus financial literacy, that’s all we need.  
Consumers don’t really need paternalistic regulation in the marketplace, and 
certainly the marketplace would be harmed by it.” 
 
 54. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 197 (2008). 
 55. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency:  Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & 
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But the current Bureau’s perspective on education—and not just the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau but I think more generally across the 
Obama Administration—is not to embrace regulation as the solution, but 
very much to view financial decision making as necessarily involving a 
decision both by consumers and by lenders to enter into a contract that is a 
bilateral arrangement, and therefore that both have some responsibility in 
the arrangement—which isn’t to push all of the faults or the responsibility 
on one side or the other of that financial transaction.  Also an 
understanding, as mentioned earlier, that these education initiatives can 
actually assist with disclosure.  So if you know more about what is being 
disclosed, then the disclosure is more meaningful. 
It can also interact with regulators’ responsibilities.  If they understand 
what it is about disclosure that consumers are having trouble with 
understanding, then that will help them both in formulating educational 
initiatives as well as the regulation.  So they work together. 
One of the takeaways here is that although it’s obviously very difficult to 
get it perfectly, what’s very interesting is that empirical studies show that 
consumers actually like it, even when it’s mandated.56  So in a context 
where you would think they would bridle and they would object, in the 
context that I know a lot about, in bankruptcy, consumer individuals now 
are required to obtain credit counseling before entering bankruptcy and to, 
in addition, obtain what I refer to as debtor education as a condition to 
receiving their ultimate discharge at the end of bankruptcy. 
I would have expected adults saying, “Why are you making me sit 
through this class?  This is boring, it’s unnecessary, it’s expensive.”  And 
yet, empirical data show that consumer debtors in the bankruptcy context 
quite like the course and think that they’ve learned a lot from it.57 
One of the measures of success, which you referred to earlier, Alexie, 
was we talked about knowledge acquisition and behavioral measures.  But 
another measure is just attitudinal.  So if financial decision making is all 
about having a different attitude about credit, if consumers like the 
education they are going to have a different attitude about credit. 
PROF. BOYACK:  I think that a main point is to find that sweet spot.  
We’re trying to find that sweet spot between too much regulatory 
paternalism and too much relying solely on consumer empowerment.  We 
want to do both so we can be right at the right— 
PROF. BLOCK-LIEB:  It’s not even necessarily 50/50. 
PROF. BOYACK:  No, no.  Whatever the right balance is. 
MS. ROTHMAN:  On that note, maybe the final question is:  In your 
opinion, has the current CFPB regime gone far enough or is there more that 
 
 56. See Deborah Thorne & Katherine Porter, Debtors’ Assessments of Bankruptcy 
Financial Education, in CONSUMER KNOWLEDGE AND FINANCIAL DECISIONS 197, 201 
(Douglas J. Lamdin ed., 2012) (“[A]pproximately 330,000 debtors each year may be 
enthusiastic about the ability of financial education courses to help people avoid financial 
collapse.”). 
 57. See id. 
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needs to happen for financial literacy and consumer protection to have real 
meaning? 
PROF. BLOCK-LIEB:  This is a long-term project. 
PROF. BOYACK:  And we’re just at the very first stage. 
PROF. BLOCK-LIEB:  We don’t even have a real director yet—no 
offense to Rich Cordray. 
PROF. BOYACK:  Right now we are at the very beginning of the road 
and we’re looking ahead.  It looks like we have some interesting ideas, but 
we’ll have to see where they go. 
PROF. BLOCK-LIEB:  My fingers are crossed. 
MS. ROTHMAN:  Thank you very much, Professors Block-Lieb and 
Boyack, for joining us today, and thank you for joining us in our 
conversation on financial literacy. 
 
